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WHAT EFFECTS DO PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIONS HAVE ON LABOR DISPUTES?
A LOOK AT CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS
AMIE E. BERGIN
University of Rhode Island
Strikes were once considered an effective “go to” weapon in the labor movement. As union density has
declined, so has the frequency and effectiveness of strikes. Strikes were once a tried and true tactic for labor unions
to force employers to make concessions at the bargaining table. However over the past twenty-five years strikes
have become a somewhat risky gamble with uncertain, often disastrous results. This paper examines the new role of
public relations campaigns that labor unions employ in bargaining as it relates to work stoppages. What, if any,
pressures do these “corporate campaigns” exert on employers during work stoppages? Do they help labor unions
further their objectives? Do they force employers to make concessions in order to avoid a strike or to quickly end a
strike?

THE DECLINE IN WORK STOPPAGES
The strike or threat of a strike has traditionally
been the most effective leverage available to labor
unions to pressure an employer during collective
bargaining negotiations (Susser 1989). The Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) began tracking work
stoppages that involved more than 1,000 workers
in the year 1947. At the height of strike activity in
the 1950s and 1960s, the BLS routinely recorded
work stoppages involving more than 1,000
workers at numbers that regularly approached or
exceeded 400 strikes annually (Statistics 2005).
During this period of frequent labor stoppages
there was no doubt that there would be strikes. The
uncertainty revolved around whether the strikes
would be endorsed by the local union or if they
would be unendorsed wildcat strikes (Brecher
1997). During that time in labor history, labor
unions made a number of impressive gains in
terms of wages, healthcare, insurance, and pension
benefits through the collective bargaining process
(Zieger 1986).
Strike Ineffectiveness
Social Conflict. As the anti-war and the civil
rights movements progressed throughout the
1960s, the American public increasingly turned its
attention to these and other matters of social and
public policy and focused less attention on the
concerns of the labor movement that had
dominated the previous decade (Zieger 1986). The
social turmoil of that decade brought every
American institution under attack, and despite the
gains that had been made for workers since the
National Labor Relations Act was passed into law

in 1935, unions were not exempt from the
scrutiny. Charges of racism and corruption among
labor unions damaged the credibility that the labor
movement had fought so hard to gain and the
frequency and seemingly arbitrary use of strikes as
a means of collective bargaining began to
undermine labor’s legitimacy (Manheim 2001,
Zieger 1986). The issues of the labor movement
and its members, while still aligned with those of
the American public, took a backseat to other
issues during that period, most notably civil rights
and the Vietnam conflict.
Permanent Replacements. The United States
Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case
N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. that
employers could replace workers who took part in
a work stoppage for economic reasons. In its
decision, the Court was extremely careful to draw
the distinction between strikes for economic
purposes, particularly when negotiations break
down despite the employers good faith bargaining,
and those that take place as a result of an unfair
labor practice by an employer. Employers used
permanent replacements as a means to maintain
production during work stoppages sparingly until
the early 1980s. In 1981, the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) struck
in response to stalled negotiations with the Federal
Aviation Association (FAA). After the striking
workers failed to return to work upon a directive
from then President Ronald Reagan, the President
fired the entire workforce and permanently
replaced them. The use of permanent replacements
by the federal government in response to a strike
had not been done since the Great Depression
(Brecher 1997). Although PATCO’s members
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were federal employees and thus engaged in an
illegal strike, the use of replacement workers by
the federal government lent credibility to this
practice for other employers, particularly those in
the private sector (Masters 1997). Following
Regan’s use of replacement workers, employers in
increasing numbers began to do the same in order
to maintain productivity during a strike and defeat
the striking workers and the union (Manheim
2001).
While labor unions had often used the threat
of a strike to pressure employers and secure a
settlement at the bargaining table, employers have
in turn increasingly used the threat of permanent
replacements to head off a strike by the union
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan et al. 1998). The
use of permanent replacements can turn a strike
into long term job loss for employees and has, in
some cases, lead to the destruction of the local
union. The labor movement has spent untold time
and resources trying to pass legislation to prohibit
the use of permanent replacements. To date they
have not been successful in their efforts, and
employers’ use of permanent replacements to fill
the production gap left by striking workers
continues to have a chilling effect on the number
of strikes in the United States. Larger firms are
able to withstand the negative impacts of strikes
on business and production longer than labor
unions and striking workers in part because they
are able to quickly hire replacement workers,
giving them a significant advantage (Rose 1991).
While the number of strikes had steadily declined
thorough the late 1970’s, strikes began to plummet
in numbers after the PATCO strike and in 2003
the BLS recorded only 14 strikes (BLS Data
2004).
Union Density. The decline in the number of
strikes can in part be attributed to declining
number of union members (Susser 1989). Union
membership is currently 12.5% nationally, the
lowest level since the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) began keeping tracking this data (Labor
Relations Reporter 2005). The dwindling number
of union members makes it increasingly difficult
for labor unions to strike in the large numbers they
once did, further eroding solidarity among
members during a strike and the financial impact
of a strike on an employer, further increasing the
employers ability to withstand the strike.
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Media Coverage. Some researchers have
suggested that media coverage of strikes and other
union activities are biased and favor employers
(Flynn 2000). In the period between 1946 and
1985, one study found that media coverage
concentrated more on strike activity than any other
union activity and that media reports exaggerated
the frequency of strikes (Schmidt 1993). Most
importantly Schmidt noted that media coverage
appeared to have an overall negative effect on the
public opinion of labor unions. Consequently
while the number of strikes has declined
drastically, media coverage of strikes has risen and
the American public’s disapproval of labor unions
has increased.
It is clear that striking is no longer an effective
means of pressuring employers at the bargaining
table. The American public and the media have
shifted their focus away from the labor movement
to that of other social and public policy concerns.
Employers are much more resistant to strikes as a
result of declining union membership and their
increased willingness to use of replacement
workers. The decline in the number of strikes
coupled with numerous highly publicized failed
strikes has reinforced the public view that this
once crippling union tactic has, as a stand alone
measure, lost its effectiveness (Masters 1997).
A NEW TACTIC: THE CORPORATE
CAMPAIGN
By the early 1980’s, labor unions had begun to
experiment with corporate style campaigns during
bargaining (Franklin 2001). Unions recognized
that they needed more effective methods to
pressure employers at during collective bargaining
negotiations, as strikes and even picket lines were
no longer effective. Slowly unions began to realize
that they could put pressure on employers by
pressuring their stakeholders. Stakeholders include
employees, customers, investors, vendors and
suppliers, stockholders, presidents and board
members, business partners and customers
(Jawahar & McLaughlin 2001).
Unions
recognized that the battles they waged needed to
be about more than just wages and working
conditions - they needed issues that possessed both
social and moral appeal to attract a larger group of
supporters for their efforts, namely religious and
community groups and leaders (Franklin 2001).
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The term corporate campaign is defined by
Jarol B. Manheim as follows:
A coordinated, often long-term, and wideranging program of economic, political, legal
and psychological warfare usually, but not
exclusively, initiated by a union or by organized
labor in general. It is directed against a
corporation that has opposed unionization,
declined to accept contract terms a union deems
critical, or in some other way refused to yield on
some issue of great importance to the
organization launching the campaign…it is
warfare waged in the media, where the union or
other group seek to redefine the image and
undermine the
reputation of the target
company through systematic and unrelenting
pressure…to cause so much pain and disruption
that management is forced to yield to their will.

Manheim offered this definition in The Death
of a Thousand Cuts in 2001. By that time, labor
unions had identified a number of public relations
based tactics which could be used to pressure
employers at the bargaining table that did not
revolve solely around work stoppages. Unions
began
to
employ
corporate
campaigns
intermittently in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
but it wasn’t until the 1990’s that the labor
movement began to perfect and rely upon these
public relations efforts as a means of pressuring
employers for purposes of collective bargaining.
Since that time, corporate campaigns have become
a conventional weapon in labor’s organizing and
bargaining efforts (Manheim 2001). The following
section of this paper examines how and why
corporate style campaigns are successful in
pressuring employers.
Corporate campaigns attempt to influence
employers by pressuring the employer’s
stakeholders. This is a departure from strikes,
which attempt to pressure the employer alone. In
addition to the earlier definition of stakeholders
offered by Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001), they
extend the definition of stakeholders as any person
or organization that can affect or is affected by the
organization and their objectives.
As it is
generally accepted that companies are dependant
upon their stakeholders for survival, it follows that
they will pay attention to them in order to insure
their survival.
The more dependants an
organization is on its stakeholders, the greater
power the stakeholders have over the company
(Jawahar & McLaughlin 2001).
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For stakeholders to exert their influence on a
company they must posses three attributes: power,
legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell, et. al. 1997).
As discussed above, stakeholders have significant
influence when the company is dependant upon
them for its survival. When unions themselves do
not have power, they can gain power by
influencing other stakeholders to exert pressure on
the employer. Legitimacy and urgency, for the
purposes of this paper, have to do with the
demands that a stakeholder makes to the company
on a labor union’s behalf. These demands must be
viewed as responsible and justified in light of the
existing circumstances. Otherwise the company
and its stakeholders will not view the demands as
being so imperative as to warrant a concession.
Finally, demands must be urgent. Urgency takes
place when a matter is time sensitive or of the
utmost importance. During a corporate campaign,
unions must present a compelling case to other
stakeholder in order to pressure them to take
action against the employer. These three attributes
are paramount to a union’s effort to gain allies
who will exert pressure on a company they might
otherwise have a good relationship with to make
concessions to the union.
Ray Rogers is widely considered to be the
father of the use of the corporate campaign by the
labor movement. Rogers worked for a number of
labor unions throughout his career and is currently
the president Corporate Campaign, Inc. His New
York based company develops corporate
campaigns exclusively for labor unions. The
campaigns focus on internal union solidarity,
membership and family involvement and
generating favorable media coverage to help labor
unions gain leverage during collective bargaining
negotiations. Rogers is credited with pioneering
labors employ of the corporate campaign in the
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union
(ACTWU) organizing campaign against the
notoriously anti-union J.P. Stevens & Co. from
1976 to 1980 (Manheim 2001). He has been
involved in a number of high-profile corporate
campaigns throughout his career and Corporate
Campaign, Inc. has been featured in such
publications as Time, Business Week, Forbes,
Fortune, The Wall Street Journal, The New York
Times, Newsday, USA Today, The Washington
Post as well as a number of television programs.
Time magazine wrote the following about Rogers
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and his company: (Rogers has) "brought some of
the most powerful corporations to their knees, and
his ideas are spreading" (Brecher 1997, Corporate
Campaign, Inc.). Rogers continues to be active in
this area on behalf of labor unions.
HOW DO “CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS”
WORK?
As stated earlier, corporate campaigns are an
attempt by a labor union to pressure an employer
by compelling their stakeholders into action
against the employers on behalf of the union.
These campaigns attempt to influence stakeholders
to exert pressure on companies, in an attempt to
force employers to yield to the demands of the
union. Research and strategy play a key role in
corporate campaigns. During a campaign labor
unions research companies finances (vendors,
creditors, and investors), stakeholder (board of
directors, customers, managers and executives),
employment practices (compensation, health &
safety) and other matters relevant to the
company’s union employees (Manheim 2001).
The research has two goals. The first is to find a
weakness within the company that the union may
publicly exploit to gain the attention of the
stakeholders. This can sometimes have nothing to
do with the matter at issue during collective
bargaining. During the Teamsters wildly
successful strike of UPS in 1997, the union was
able to pressure the company and gain the
sympathy of the general public by publicizing the
fact that the company had an injury rate that was
2.5 times higher than the industry average. The
rate of injuries was central to the Teamsters
campaign against UPS, but the main dispute at the
bargaining table concerned health insurance
coverage and the unions’ demand that UPS offer
more full-time, benefits eligible employment
opportunities, not worker safety (Brecher 1997).
Research is the first and often most important step
in a corporate campaign.
The role of public opinion and the media
Public opinion plays a significant role in the
influence of labor unions at the bargaining table.
Negative opinions of unions rose sharply after
1972 and have remained somewhat high ever since
(Schmidt 1993). Public opinion polls demonstrate
that while the majority of Americans approve of
labor unions representation of employees, many

4

feel unions are too powerful, self-serving, lead by
persons who are untrustworthy and engage in too
many strikes (Jarley 1994). In that same study
Jarley noted that the public views strikes as an
unsavory tactic and generally support initiatives
designed to reduce the frequency and duration of
strikes such as cooling-off periods, limits on strike
duration and the right of effected third parties to
recover lost income as a result of a strike.
Media coverage of strikes (or lack thereof)
also contributes to the public opinions about labor
unions. The media is more likely to cover an
interest based dispute rather than one involving an
allegation of an unfair labor practice, and work
stoppages involving a large number of employees
are more likely to garner the media’s interest. The
size and duration of a strike also have a positive
effect on media coverage. Further, some research
has shown that as the number of strikes decline, so
does the amount of coverage that remaining labor
activities get, as the media may deem unionrelated coverage to be less important to its readers
(Erickson 1996). It has also been shown that labor
disputes in certain industries such as transportation
or public utilities receive greater media attention
than others, such as the garment industry (Flynn
2000). This may be in part because these jobs are
specialized are not able to be outsourced to either
permanent replacements or plants overseas.
Further, strikes in these industries tend to greatly
affect the public welfare. Media attention to labor
disputes involving the threat of a work stoppage
has been shown to not only increase the likelihood
of a strike but also to increase the duration of the
strike if one takes place (Flynn 2000). Strike
activity is often seen by the public in a negative
view, and thus it has a negative effect on union
approval (Jarley 1994). Therefore, any action must
be closely linked to the issue at hand (Turner
2001).
While this research suggests that labor unions
are not playing on a level field with employers in
terms of favorable media attention, this author
would propose that the numerous recent scandals
involving corporations may have leveled the
playing field somewhat. Only time will tell, but it
is safe to say that in many cases unions begin their
campaigns at a considerable disadvantage in terms
of public opinion. However, the threat of negative
publicity can be most effective on employers who
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routinely tout their positive working conditions to
the media and the public (Turner 2001). In terms
of the legitimacy of their efforts, unions should be
especially concerned that the public believes that
they are pursuing reasonable goals.
How do unions get their message out?
As union membership continues to decline,
more of the American public gets their
information about unions from the media rather
than from union members (Jarley 1994).
Commentators note that since the 1940s, media
coverage of labor unions and labor disputes has
not only decreased, but it has moved from the
front page of the newspaper to the back page of
the business section (Jarley 1994). Further,
reporters are no longer versed in the ways of union
life. Because the quantity and quality of reporting
on labor issues has decreased, labor unions must
find alternate ways to get their message to the
American public.
Generating positive media coverage.
To garner media coverage, organizations must
be involved in something deemed to be worth
reporting by the news media (Schmidt 1993). As
discussed earlier, media coverage increasingly
tends to focus on strike activity, over which the
public generally expresses disapproval, and less on
collective bargaining and other union initiatives.
Thus it can be inferred that typical union activities
such as collective bargaining and public education
initiatives are not of interest to the general public
or the media, while more dramatic events are, such
as strikes. Because sensational media coverage
gains the attention of the general public, unions
must take great care to ensure that their message is
legitimate in order to stave off negative reactions
from the public. This is particularly important
because media coverage has been shown to have
the greatest impact on the opinions of persons
otherwise tend to have little or no opinion about
labor unions (Schmidt 1993). Furthermore, as the
influence of the media has grown over the past
two decades, researchers have tracked a decline in
favorable coverage of labor union by the media
(Puette 1992). The public view of labor unions is
generally lumped together by the public. Thus the
way that an individual views one labor union
generally reflects how that person views labor
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unions and the labor movement as a whole (Puette
1992).
The Justice for Janitors, which has become the
icon of the new labor movement, was exceedingly
successful in generating positive media coverage.
SEIU faced significant employer oppositions and
public apathy when it began its campaign to
organize janitors in Los Angeles in the early
1990s. The Union carefully built a media strategy
that was able to portray the janitors, who were by
and large immigrants, as the symbol of the
working poor and contrasted them with the
wealthy executives whose offices they cleaned.
The Union was successful in organizing the
janitors in 1991 and in renegotiating their contract
in 1995 but faced significant hurdles during the
2000 collective bargaining negotiations. The
janitors were employed by cleaning contractors,
whose services were contracted by building
owners throughout the city. The building owners
were free from the pressures of collective
bargaining, as they could simply switch to a nonunion contractor if wages were raised by more
than they cared to pay. In 2000, the Union was
demanding a $1.00 per hour wage increase, while
the building owners had only offered $0.50. When
compared to the building owners and occupying
executives’ salaries, the amount seemed
insignificant to the public and their sympathies
were firmly on the side of the workers.
Additionally, mass rallies and pickets were
organized by the union. The rallies took place at
night because this was when the janitors were
scheduled to work.
It also allowed the
demonstrations to go forward in a way that was
not disruptive to the public at large. This all-out
assault on the position of the employer by the
community resulted in overwhelming public
sympathy from a city that often seemed hostile
towards immigrants and caused the building
owners to cave to the Union’s demands in less
than three weeks (Erickson, et. Al 2002).
The Internet. Labor unions have increasingly
turned to the Internet to get their message out to
the public. The Internet allows labor unions to
spread their message in a way that is unfettered by
their adversaries. While those who view a labor
unions website are generally persons who are
sympathetic to labor, these sites offer unlimited
information on any number of corporate
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campaigns that the unions are engaged in. The
AFL-CIO’s website includes a section entitled
“Eye on Corporate America”.
The website
contains detailed information on a variety of
corporate campaigns against companies like WalMart contains information on company ownership,
executive compensation, employer practices and
employee pay. According to a senior research
analyst with SEIU, the union increasingly uses
web campaigns as a tactic because it is a cost
effective way to target multiple companies at the
same time (MacFadyen 2004). SEIU pressured
GTCR and its portfolio companies through a
website called “GTCR Watch” in 1996 rather than
striking or filing legal charges. The website
highlighted what the Union considered to be poor
management practices and alleged fraud at their
portfolio companies. While that campaign is
ongoing, executives at GTCR have made public
statements distancing themselves from one such
company, AnswerThink Inc. (MacFadyen 2004).
Union Handbooks. Union handbooks provide
information about corporate campaigns and a
variety of legal methods which instruct members
about methods at their disposal to apply pressure
on the employer from inside the firm. Slowdowns
and work-to-rule campaigns were standard
pressure tactics used by labor unions in the 1930s
and have been revived as strikes have grown less
effective. In 1986 the AFL-CIO published a one
such member handbook called The Inside Game.
Demand was so strong the AFL-CIO eventually
printed and distributed over 100,000 copies of this
manual (Brecher 1997). The manual’s stated
objective is to “assist unions large and small in
devising strategies targeted at employer economic
and political relationship – including dealings with
other union, shareholders, customers, creditors,
elected officials, government agencies and the
general public” in order to persuade the employer
that the cost of not reaching an agreement with the
union will be more costly to them than the price of
the unions bargaining demands (Inside the Game,
Yates 1998). Other unions publish similar
manuals, including SEIU’s Contract Campaign
Manual and the CWA’s Mobilizing for the 90s.
Besides offering pressure tactics these manuals
promote the message that a united workforce
brings power to the union (Yates 1998). All of
these manuals instruct rank-and-file union
members with regard to one of the most frequently

6

used tactics of a corporate campaign - work-torule strategies. These manual also urges union
members to recruit volunteers from outside the
company to flood the firm with calls related to
collective bargaining measures. They include
information about recruitment, the importance of
well thought out and clearly defined goals,
timetables for reached the goals, and research in
defining goals. They cover how to gather
information about the company, particularly
financial information and the value of disgruntled
employees as sources. These strategies are part of
a greater approach to pressure employers to
concede to the union’s demands at the bargaining
table (Susser 1989).
Coalition building. Unions have begun to
form new partnerships with unlikely alliances in
an attempt to increase their power base. The socalled Blue-Green alliance between labor unions
and environmental groups is one such example
(Turner 2004). This improbable alliance allows
labor unions to reach constituents who otherwise
would not turn out in force in support of the causes
of the labor movement. The alliance spreads
labor’s message to environmental groups, a group
that has also placed corporate America in their
crosshairs, but for different reason. For example,
labor and environmentalist groups have joined
forces to fight President Bush’s plans for drilling
in the ANWAR region of Alaska, an effort that
would not normally be considered an issue of
concern to labor unions (Turner 2004). In fact,
labor unions have begun to ally themselves with
women’s groups, human and civil rights activists
and consumer protection advocates as a means of
recruiting supporters (Turner 2004). Additionally,
labor unions have courted the anti-sweatshop
movement, as both groups have publicly stated
their interest in curtailing the use of labor in
underdeveloped countries where poor labor
standards often make it cheaper to manufacture a
variety of products, which unions often blame for
draining jobs away from America (Turner 2004).
As they say, politics makes strange, and in this
case powerful, bedfellows.
Labor has increasingly turned to religious
organizations with regard to its coalition building
efforts.
Ray Rogers’s company, Corporate
Campaigns, Inc., advertises that it maintains a
network of various religious organizations of all
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faiths (Corporate Campaign, Inc.). John Sweeney,
the president of the AFL-CIO, is a devout catholic
and called for a closer alliance between unions and
religious groups and went so far to set up the
National Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice
(Manheim 2001). The Committee boasts a
network of 40 organizations in 24 states that
support labor and social justice activities at the
local level (Manheim 2001). It highlights the
participation of religious groups’ participation in
labor activity, sets forth a code of conduct for
those activities and lobbies for compensation and
health and safety issues and against discrimination
in the workplace based on faith and ethnicity
(Manheim 2001). These affiliations and
organizations have been important with regard to
corporate campaigns and strikes at the local level.
Supporters of corporate campaigns have
included not only the groups mentioned above, but
also the United Methodist Church, the National
Baptist Convention, the National Consumer
League, Children Against Underage Servitude and
Employment, the National Council of Churches,
the National Organization for Women, the
Rainbow Coalition, and the Rainforest Action
Network (Manheim 2001). In the late 1970s the
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union
spent almost five (5) years locked in a battle with
J.P. Stevens trying to organize its workers, many
of whom were African-American women. In the
first identifiable corporate campaign of its kind,
the union was able to use their alliances with civil
rights and women’s group to pressure the
company and its stakeholders over the duration of
the campaign (Brecher 1997).
The living wage movement and the Justice for
Janitors campaigns are perfect examples of the
effectiveness of these coalitions.
The labor
movement has joined forces with civil rights
organizations, community groups, local churches
and political organizations and their efforts have
resulted in the passage of living wage ordinances
in over 70 cities (Turner 2004). During the Justice
for Janitors campaigns in Los Angeles SEIU was
able to assemble a coalition consisting of local and
national labor unions including the Los Angeles
Building Trades Council and Los Angeles County
Federation of Labor, religious groups, community
activists and political organizations. The support
that these groups lent to the janitors in their
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organizing efforts and during the strike was
immeasurable. The Catholic Church held masses
in honor of the janitors and Cardinal Roger
Mahoney publicly offered to mediate the strike.
The Teamsters refused to collect trash from the
buildings where the janitors worked and the
Operating Engineers refused to perform any
maintenance on them. During the strike the Los
Angeles County Federation of Labor organized a
food distribution program for striking workers,
and the Los Angeles City Council, Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors and the California
State Assembly passed resolutions to support the
demands of the union (Erickson, et. Al 2002). The
Justice for Janitors corporate campaigns
demonstrate that the support that labor unions can
derive from non-labor causes can be of significant
importance during a corporate campaign. The
leverage that these groups apply to employers and
opinion leaders can help to sway public opinion
and place further pressure on employers.
MOBILIZING SUPPORT
Laying the groundwork in the community.
The success of the Los Angeles Justice for
Janitors campaigns rests in large part with the
work that was done in the community long before
the public campaign began. Their efforts focused
on the creating the ability to influence public
opinion, not the employer. Union organizers began
contacting potential allies one year before
contacting the employers with regard to organizing
their workers. By that time they had secured the
support of other labor unions, religious,
community and political leaders, all of whom
publicly supported their campaign (Erickson, et.
Al 2002). The importance of support from the
community can not be underestimated during a
corporate campaign, as is demonstrated by the
examples provided in this paper.
During the 1997 Teamsters strike against UPS,
customer relationships were widely publicized by
the Union in their media efforts (Guy 2003).
Because UPS drivers worked regular routs, many
had a familiar relationship with their customers.
Prior to the strike, the Teamsters union encouraged
their members to speak directly to customers about
the dispute and education them with regard to the
union’s position (Guy 2003). When the strike
began on August 4, 1997, it was the largest strike
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that the United States had seen in 20 years
(Brecher 1997). The Union’s efforts of educating
customers prior to the dispute had paid off – a
USA Today/CNN Gallup Poll showed that 55% of
respondents supported the union while only 27%
supported UPS. After 15 days the company, which
was scheduled to meet to discuss a proposal to
bring in replacement workers, instead announced a
settlement with the Union that included most of
the union’s demands. With public support firmly
behind the union and estimated losses of $30
million per day during the strike, UPS had no
other choice (Brecher 1997).
Targeting the employer. As a means of
achieving its goals, unions will often attempt to
portray the employer it has targeted in a negative
manner in the media and to the public. Unions
may make the details of negotiations public,
particularly as they relate to excessive demands by
the employer in an attempt to garner public
sympathy. An image conscious employer may be
leery of widespread and prominent negative media
coverage about a labor dispute, particularly if they
anticipate the union’s demands to be perceived as
reasonable by the public.
Unions may also take a closer look at the
companies’ financial records to determine the
company’s profits, ability to pay wage increases
and to determine the salaries of the company’s
executives (Susser 1989). The United Steelworks
of America undertook such research during their
strike at the Ravenswood Aluminum Company
(RAC) in October of 1990. During that campaign
the Union tirelessly researched the company’s
financials and discovered that fugitive financier
Marc Rich owned a controlling interest in the
company (Turner 2001). The Union made sure
this information was well publicized, including
distributing “Wanted” flyers featuring Rich’s
picture. The Union pressured Rich’s business
operations in Europe and was able to block his
attempt to purchase the Slovakian National
Aluminum Company and a majority share of a
Romanian hotel. Shortly afterwards, Rich replace
the senior management team at RAC and settled
the contract with the union, bringing an end to the
20-month strike (Turner 2001). The settlement
provided for a wage increase, cost of living
increase and back pay for striking workers.
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Regulatory Charges. Unions can directly
target an employer through an assortment of
activities. As described earlier, union members can
target the firm through work slowdowns, work-torule actions and negative publicity. The Union
may also target the employer through by filing
charges with regulatory agencies that oversee any
portion of the company’s industry. During the 162
corporate campaigns identified Jarol B. Manheim
between 1974 and 1999, labor unions filed charges
with the following federal regulatory agencies in
an attempt to pressure the employer and other
company stakeholders: the Department of Justice,
the Department of Labor, the Department of State,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Federal Trade Commission,
the Health Care Finance Administration, the
Internal Revenue Service, the National Labor
Relations Board, the Occupational Safety and
Health Organization and the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Charges of Unfair Labor Practices and health
and safety violations against employers can be
extremely influential during a corporate campaign.
While employers are not prohibited from replacing
economic strikers, they are prohibited from
replacing employees who strike over an
employer’s unfair labor practice(s) or health and
safety violation(s) (Turner 2001). During the
Steelworker’s campaign against the Ravenswood
Aluminum Company, the Union filed a number of
unfair labor charges and healthy and safety
complaints against the company. The information
had been meticulously documented over several
years by a disgruntled union steward (Turner
2001). As a result, the Occupational Safety and
Health Organization ordered an unprecedented
wall to wall inspection of RAC’s facilities and the
National Labor Relations Board issued a
complaint against the company (Turner 2001). The
OSHA inspection eventually resulted in hundreds
of thousands of dollars worth of fines, and
undoubtedly provided Marc Rich with an even
greater motive to settle with the union.
OSHA was also involved in the
Bridgestone/Firestone strike. In 1994 the
organization issued a hefty fine against the
company as a result of charges filed by the United
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Rubber Workers during a strike. Labor Secretary
Robert Reich hand delivered the notice to the
company in a well-coordinated and highly
publicized confrontation (Franklin 2001). The
strike dragged on for two more years after the
fines were levied and the company finally reached
an agreement with the union in response to
mounting criticism from the American public for
sending jobs overseas (Brecher 1997).
Boycotts and Picketing. As part of a corporate
campaign, unions may boycott or picket an
employer in an attempt to keep other workers and
customers from patronizing the employer (Flynn
2000). Secondary boycotts occur when a party to a
labor dispute attempts to coerce a third party to
take part in their boycott of an employer.
Secondary boycotts are a violation the National
Labor Relations Act (Susser 1989). However the
United States Supreme Court has held that
“publicity…for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public, including consumers and members of a
labor organization, that the product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor
organization has a primary dispute are distributed
by another employer” is permitted (DeBartolo

Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction, 485 U.S. 568, 108 S.Ct. 1392
(1988). In that same case the Court has upheld
hand billing in the absence or picketing or
violence is permissible. In a successor to that case
known as DeBartolo II, the court extended the
rights of labor unions to target any company that
has a business link to the employer with whom the
union has a dispute. Employers who are
particularly image conscious and sensitive to
negative publicity may be more likely to yield if
they perceive picketing or boycotting will be
successful (Manheim 2001).
Picketing proved to be an extremely effective
tactic during the 2000 Justice for Janitors strike.
As referenced earlier, the picketing took place at
night so that it would not disrupt commuters. The
constant picketing night after night kept the news
media interested in the strike, thus keeping it in the
public eye. In 2002 the International
Longshoremen’s strike resulted in picket lines at
ports across the country and millions of dollars in
losses to shippers whose goods perished or were
delayed as a result (Bonney 2003). Due to the
skilled nature of the work, the strikers could not be
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replaced. The monetary value of the loss of goods
forced the shippers to settle the strike, despite the
lack of public support for dockworkers.
When members of the United Food and
Commercial Workers struck Safeway grocery
stores throughout California in 2003 during a
strike, customers refrained from crossing the
picket lines and shopped in other grocery stores in
large numbers. As a customer relations tactic the
stores had implemented “superior customer
service” programs in most of its stress in the early
1990s. Superior Customer Service called on
employees to anticipate customer needs,
proactively help customers find products, suggest
substitutes if products were out of stock and most
importantly learn customers’ names. During the
strike the union used extensive hand billing to
inform customers about the dispute, particularly
the company’s attempt to cut the health care
benefits of its workers. In addition to picketing
and hand billing the union also asked customers to
sign pledge cards which stated that they would
refrain from shopping at Safeway. The strike
lasted nine (9) days. After the strike was over and
Safeway backed away from their demands to make
significant changes to employee health coverage
the Union stated publicly that they came away
from the strike with a better contract than they had
originally hoped for. In the aftermath, both the
union and management acknowledged two factors
- the public sensitivity to health care and the
familiarity that strikers had with customers as a
result of the Superior Customer Service program
as reasons why Safeway lost an alarming rate of
business during the strike (Guy 2003).
Targeting Board Members.
Unions have had some success in targeting the
board of directors for larger companies. Board
members are charged with satisfying of
stakeholders with different interests – employees
and stockholders. Available resources influence a
company’s decisions, especially as they try to
remain profitable and satisfy stakeholders, which
generally involves engaging in low risk behavior
with relation to the companies practices (Jawahar
& McLaughlin 2001). Members of Boards of
directors are often a target of unions during a
corporate campaign because they often serve in
high capacities at other firms, making them
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vulnerable to union pressure (Susser 1989). Board
members are often familiar with labor relations of
the company as well as the details of the dispute.
Because they are Board members they certainly
hold a great deal of power when it comes to
making decisions about that dispute. Unions will
often threaten to handbill or picket a shareholders
meeting in an attempt to embarrass and pressure
Board members. In the J.P. Stevens case cited
earlier, an officer from the New York Life
Insurance Company was forced to resign from J.P.
Stevens Board of Directors because the ACTWU
threatened to oppose his campaign form
membership on the Board of Directors at New
York Life (Susser 1989).
Targeting business partners.
Corporations build their reputations on the
trust and confidence they gain from their
stakeholders (Manheim 2001). This not only refers
to a company’s employees and customers but also
its investors, suppliers, vendors and partners.
Evidence suggests that a strike can often have a
negative effect on the firm’s investors and
suppliers as a result of a loss in business (Pearsons
1995). Companies that buy from or sell their
products to the struck firm may also be negatively
affected (DeFusco and Fuess 1991). A study of
steel suppliers during automotive worker strikes
demonstrated that the steel supplier’s profits were
negatively affected by the slowdown in production
caused by major strikes (Persons 1995).
Additionally it has been shown that non-struck
competitors sometimes enjoy increased business
as a result of a strike (Kramer 1996). As a result,
unions may also exert pressure on other companies
that do business with the company they seek to
target. During the Ravenswood Aluminum
Company campaign the union used the
information it had regarding Marc Rich to pressure
beverage companies who used aluminum from
Ravenswood to manufacture their product to find
another supplier. The campaign also sought to
inform the consumers of these manufacturers
about RAC’s malfeasance. As a result, numerous
beverage companies including Stroh’s and
Budweiser stopped using RAC products (Turner
2001). The loss of business undoubtedly provide
March Rick and RAC with another reason to settle
the strike with the union.
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Unions often control significant member
pension funds, and a threat to withdraw those
funds from an institution during a labor dispute
can result in losses in the millions and billions of
dollars for the financial institution if it is carried
out. Such withdrawals are permissible provided
that the assets are not adversely affected as a result
(Susser 1989). The Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers Union threatened to withdraw $1
billion in pension funds from the Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Company during the height of their
dispute with J.P. Stevens because one of the
bank’s executives was a member of J.P. Stevens
Board of Directors. This lead to the resignation of
the chief executive of Avon from the J.P. Stevens
board. Shortly thereafter the chief executives of
New York Life and J.P. Stevens resigned
simultaneously from each other’s boards (Susser
1989). The campaign lasted five long years, but in
1980, J.P. Stevens finally agreed to union
representation of its employees.
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Strike Funds.
While not all corporate campaigns include a
strike, many of the higher profile and successful
campaigns discussed here did. The shortage of
funds for labor activities, including funds for
striking workers, into the mid 1990s can account
for some decline in the number of strikes as well
as an increase in the number of union members
who cross picket lines. During the UPS strike
referenced earlier, striking Teamsters received a
$55 per week strike benefit from the union. It is
hard to imaging how long the workers would have
lasted if the strike stretched on into months or
years, as some of the other strikes discussed in this
paper have.
When the Los Angeles County Dry Wall
workers strike in June of 1992, they began with
almost unanimous support from union members.
However as the strike stretched into its second
month, many strikers started crossing the picket
lines out of economic necessity. A strike fund was
set up by the AFL-CIO and ultimately generated
over $2 million in contributions that was used for
strike funds. Church and community groups
donated food and money to assist to striking
workers during the dispute. This kept the moral up
and kept workers from crossing picket lines
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(Turner 2001). During the strike at Ravenswood
Aluminum Company the spouses of the striking
workers set up a support group to help with
everything from financial needs to car pooling
(Turner 2001).
Strikes can be financially
devastating to workers and their families. Strike
funds and other forms of support provide the
means necessary for union members to remain on
the strike.
Support from the AFL-CIO
There is clear evidence that an increase in
strike-related coverage by the media lead to an
increase in public disapproval of labor unions
(Erickson 1996). When Ronald Reagan fired the
striking PATCO members in 1980, the AFL-CIO
sent letters to its affiliates discouraging them from
showing solidarity with the fired employees.
However, during the UPS strike in 1997 the AFLCIO threw its full support behind the striking
workers, supporting them financially as well as by
launching an all out public relations war against
UPS (Yates 1998). The AFL-CIO lent the
Teamsters $10 million per week during the 15 day
strike to support the strike fund (Brecher 1997) It
also joined with women’s groups to discuss how
part time work affected women (Brecher 1997).
As discussed earlier, the strike was a success for
the Teamsters union, and the support that they
received from the AFL-CIO, financially and
otherwise undoubtedly provided a boost to the
moral of striking workers.
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS
Do they help unions end labor disputes with
favorable results?
The traditional goal of a strike was to put
economic pressure on employers to settle disputes
(Masters 1997). During a corporate campaign
labor unions attempt to apply pressure to
employers through bearing pressure on their
stakeholders by any means necessary, in turn
forcing them to place pressure on employers
(Manheim 2001). A corporate campaign, in
conjunction with a strike or otherwise, is more
likely to bring a favorable result to the union than
a strike that does not have a long term strategy.
The use of corporate campaigns by labor unions is
on the rise, so much so that some companies have
begun to limit their use through contractual
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negotiations. J.P. Stevens, for example, insists on
what is known as the Ray Rodgers Clause in all of
its collective bargaining agreements. The clause
prohibits unions from engaging in corporate
campaigns during a labor dispute (Manheim
2001). Of course, barring any agreement to the
contrary, unions are free to take part in such
campaigns upon the expiration of the contract.
There is no hard and fast model of a corporate
campaign. Each is different and depends upon the
climate, objectives, economic realities and
personalities of the participants. Strategies and
tactics must be well thought out in advance of any
campaign and the appropriate groundwork must be
put in place before the campaign begins for it to be
successful. One needs to look no farther than the
U.S. Airways sick-out during the past holiday
season to grasp how an unplanned work action can
backfire. The sick-out resulted in hundreds of
cancelled flights and thousands of lost bags,
causing customer outrage at the height of the
Christmas travel season. The Department of
Transportation has launched an inquiry to the
debacle, and customers who spent their holiday
stranded at airports across the country will long
remember the union action that caused them to
miss their holiday travel plans. One thing is clear a well developed corporate campaign must include
the following: company research, strategy
development,
political
and
community
organization, media and public relations, and
fundraising for strike funds if necessary to be
successful.
Corporate campaigns can have a long-standing
effect on the mindset of the American public. Just
as the American public remembers the PATCO
strike as a blow to the labor movement, it will long
remember the Teamsters victory over UPS during
the strike in 1997.
The campaign against
Ravenswood Aluminum Company will always be
remembered because the union was able to track
the company’s ownership to fugitive billionaire
Marc Rich. But the campaigns that stand out the
most are the Justice for Janitors campaigns that
have become the new model for union strength
and resurgence within the labor movement. The
successful campaigns detailed in this paper,
including the Justice for Janitors campaign, the
Drywall workers strike in Los Angeles, the 1997
UPS Strike, the California Grocery Workers strike,
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J.P. Stevens and Ravenswood Aluminum
Corporation demonstrate that any number of
techniques can be used to apply pressure to
employers. Striking in and of itself is rarely an
effective tool in this day and age. Employers can
simply replace striking workers. However a
company that is dependant upon its stakeholders
for survival will yield to pressure from those
stakeholders and a successful corporate campaign,
as demonstrated here, can provide the tools
necessary for success.
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